The Modest Business Judgment Rule by Johnson, Lyman P.Q.
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2000 
The Modest Business Judgment Rule 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, johnsonlp@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. Law. 625 (2000) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
Citation: 55 Bus. Law.  625 1999-2000 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu Aug 23 14:34:08 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0007-6899
The Modest Business Judgment Rule
By Lyman Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that Delaware courts both wrongly formulate the
business judgment rule and unsoundly make it the centerpiece of corpo-
rate fiduciary analysis. The faulty formulation stems from a 1984 Delaware
Supreme Court decision, Aronson v. Lewis. I The flawed unifying of fiduciary
review under the business judgment rule rubric first appears in key 1993
and 1995 decisions in the protracted Cede litigation.
2
This Article advocates a vitally important, but modest, role for the busi-
ness judgment rule in judicial assessment of corporate decision making.
The business judgment rule, the argument runs, is better understood as a
narrow-gauged policy of non-review than as an overarching framework for
affirmatively shaping judicial review of fiduciary performance.
Delaware's doctrinal misstatement of, and conceptual misuse of, the
business judgment rule are both understandable as adaptive responses to
the same underlying historic void in Delaware law-the late emergence
of, and still unformed contours of, the duty of due care. Lacking a judi-
cially articulated duty of care until the 1960s, 3 Delaware's law on the
business judgment rule developed before that time with no explicit con-
nection to that vital duty. The business judgment rule, therefore, not the
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University. Financial support
was provided by the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University. The author
appreciates David Millon's and Frank Balotti's helpful comments and probing questions.
1. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
2. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modfied, 636 A.2d 956
(Del. 1994), affd sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
Where it is unnecessary in this Article to refer to a specific judicial opinion in the litigation,
reference will be made to "Cede." For an informative statement of facts in the Cede litigation,
see Jesse A. Finkelstein & Russell C. Silberglied, Technicolor IV: Appraisal Valuation in a Two-
Step Merger, 52 Bus. LAw. 801 (1997).
3. SeeGraham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (dictum) (stating
"that directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circum-
stances"). The Allis-Chalmers dictum appears to be the chief basis for believing that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, in the 1960s, began to recognize a director duty of care. See 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALoT-rI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.34, at 4-216 (3d ed. Supp. 1999).
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duty of care, became (and remains) the preeminent legal precept in Dela-
ware corporate law. Regrettably, this development has led to an ambitious
"burdening" of that rule with functions for which it was not designed and,
indeed, is ill-suited. This inappropriate "burdening" is evident both in
Aronson's overly broad formulation of the rule and in the comprehensive
organizing function for fiduciary analysis it was given in Cede.
The Article first describes the prevailing Aronson formulation of the rule
and Cede's unifying frameworkJor the rule. The Article next advances an
alternative model of the business judgment rule that, in both formulation
and function, is considerably more "modest" than Delaware's rule. It then
develops an argument as to why Delaware deploys the business judgment
rule so sweepingly in its corporate jurisprudence. Finally, the Article offers
several reasons why more explicit strengthening of the duty of care in
Delaware would enrich that core duty and, consequently, redress the doc-
trinal imbalance between the duty of care and a more properly modest
business judgment rule.
DELA WARE'S CURRENT FORMULATION AND USE OF
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Beginning in 1984,4 and continuing today,5 the Delaware Supreme
Court formulates the business judgment rule as "a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."'6 In 1993 and 1995 decisions in
the Cede litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court placed the Aronson for-
mulation of the business judgment rule into a wider context, linking the
rule to statutory and policy bases and, for the first time, analytically con-
necting the rule to a larger, seemingly streamlined judicial framework for
reviewing director performance of fiduciary duties. 7 The court first noted
that, by statute,8 the business and affairs of a corporation are managed by
or under the direction of its board of directors. The court next observed
that, in exercising these statutory powers, directors are "charged with an
unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
to act in the best interests of its shareholders."9
Describing the business judgment rule as "an extension of these basic
principles,"' 0 the court indicated that the rule "operates to preclude a
4. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
5. See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (quoting
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
6. Parnes, 722 A.2d at 1246; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
7. See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1162-63; Cede, 634 A.2d at 360-61.
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991), cited in Cede, 634 A.2d at 360.
9. Cede, 634 A.2d at 360.
10. Id.
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court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a
corporation."' I These unobjectionable and helpful assertions were fol-
lowed by the court's description of the rule's "powerful presumption in
favor of actions taken by the directors."' 12 Finally, the court stressed what
it regarded as the key analytical link-up between the business judgment
rule and director fiduciary duties:
To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of pro-
viding evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision,
breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith,
loyalty or due care. If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evi-
dentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to protect cor-
porate officers and directors and the decisions they make, and our
courts will not second-guess these business judgments. If the rule is
rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents
of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the "entire
fairness" of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.13
Under this analytical approach, the business judgment rule always ap-
plies for the procedural purpose of assigning to plaintiff the initial burden
on the issue of whether a director breached one or more duties. This
procedural burden-assigning function of the rule is fairly trivial, and cre-
ating a doctrine simply to assign plaintiff a burden it already had is widely
acknowledged to be unwarranted. 14 If, however, plaintiff does not meet that
evidentiary and proof burden, the weightier substantive dimension of the
business judgment rule thereupon "attaches" to protect a director against
further judicial inquiry, including inquiry into the merits or quality of the
business decision itself. If, by way of contrast, the plaintiff does meet the
burden assigned to him under the procedural aspect of the business judg-
ment rule-as, for example, by proving a director's breach of duty, such
as care-the substantive aspect of the rule, according to the Cede court,
does not apply,15 for doctrinal and policy reasons never stated by the court.
The substantive shelter of the business judgment rule, in other words,
hinges strictly on plaintiff failing to establish a breach of duty.
The non-application of the substantive aspect of the business judgment
rule in the duty-breached context, however, is not, according to the Cede
court, sufficient by itself to establish the substantive liability of the direc-
tor.
16 Instead, although a plaintiff achieves non-application of the sub-
11. Id.
12. Id. at 361.
13. Id. (citations omitted).
14. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., ROjudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48
Bus. LAw. 1337, 1345 (1993).
15. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995); Cede, 634
A.2d at 361.
16. See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1163.
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stantive business judgment rule by proving a breach of duty, the duty
breach itself does not, substantively, go beyond that effect. Rather, at this
stage the duty breach merely has the further procedural effect of shifting to
the defendants the burden of proving the entire fairness of a challenged
transaction. 17 Actual director liability and the damages outcome of the
case turn on whether, subsequently, a defendant successfully carries that
high burden. In short, under the Cede framework a proven duty of care
breach results in loss of the procedural and substantive dimensions of the
business judgment rule, but not necessarily in liability. Liability awaits ap-
plication of the stringent entire fairness standard, the same standard tra-
ditionally reserved for determining whether a director violated the quite
demanding duty of loyalty. 18
Quite apart from the significant issue of whether Cede's attempted
"roadmap" through fiduciary analysis is right or wrong on substantive
policy grounds,1 9 a recondite methodological question flows out of Cede's
invitingly cogent exposition: Is it really the function of the business judgment
rule to guide fiduciary analysis in such a crucial inquiry?
A MODEST BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
This Article does not dispute that the Aronson "presumption" formula-
tion is a sound statement of legal principle. It does contend, however, that
the statement of principle therein expressed is not-or should not be re-
garded as-the business judgment rule. Furthermore, this Article rejects
the Cede court's statement of legal principle concerning the consequences
of plaintiff proving a breach of director care and, moreover, disputes that
the slender business judgment rule somehow encapsulates far-reaching
substantive law principles.
Properly understood, business judgment rule should not be regarded as
a generalized liability shield for directors and their decisions. The rule,
likewise, is not designed to perform a host of other functions it frequently
is assigned. It is not, for example, "essentially a presumption that directors
did not breach their duty of care"; 20 nor is it a watered-down duty of care
(a sort of "Care Light").2 1 Also, the business judgment rule is not usefully
17. See id.; Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
18. See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1163; Cede, 634 A.2d at 361; infra text accompanying
note 30 (noting that judicial review standard is entire fairness where director loyalty is
implicated).
19. For an extended critique of Cede on both doctrinal and policy grounds, see Lyman
Johnson, Rethinking judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2000).
20. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23J. CORP. L. 277, 280 n.6 (1998).
21. A striking instance of treating the business judgment rule as simply a toned-down
version of the duty of care is NAorlin Corp. v. Roone; Pace Inc., 744 E2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984),
where, in applying New York law, the court stated:
The duty of care refers to the responsibility of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in the
performance of his tasks, the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar position
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(Footnote 21 continued)
would use under similar circumstances. In evaluating a manager's compliance with the
duty of care, New York courts adhere to the business judgment rule, which "bars judicial
inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of
honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes."
Id. at 264 (citation omitted). In other words, the higher standard of care (that care of a
"reasonably prudent person") is regarded as met if the lesser standards of "good faith" and
"honestjudgment" are present. Norlin's confused description of the inter-relationship between
the duty of care and the New York business judgment rule led one commentator to describe
the duty of care in that state as "largely aspirational." Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment
and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality,
52 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 615 (1984). This characterization, although accurate insofar
as Norlin is concerned, fails to capture the way in which courts, including New York courts,
pre-condition the protection of the business judgment rule on the exercise of care, a point
the commentator himself notes. See id. at 611 (noting that directors must have "exercised a
reasonable amount of diligence" before courts will apply the rule); see infra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
The 1998 amendment of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA or Model
Act) and the simultaneous addition of a new section, § 8.31 captioned "Standards of Liability
For Directors," carry forward the Norlin distinction between director "standards of conduct"
(now found in § 8.30 and including the duty of care) and "standards of liability" (now found
in § 8.31). MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (1998), in Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Electronic Filings/Standards
of Conduct and Standards of Liability for Directors, 53 Bus. LAW. 157, 176 (1997) [hereinafter
1997 MBCA Changes] (stating that "[s]ections 8.30 and 8.31 adopt the approach to director
conduct and director liability taken in the Norlin decision"); see also Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining to the Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Liabilityfor Directors-Final Adoption, 53 Bus. LAw. 813 (1998). To further complicate the
relationship between standards of conduct and standards of liability, the Official Comment
to § 8.31 indicates that section does not codify the business judgment rule "[b]ecause the
elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances of its application are contin-
uing to be developed by the courts [and therefore] it would not be desirable to freeze the
concept in a statute." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 official comment, in 1997 MBCA
Changes, supra, at 179. Having said that, however, the comment later states that the "principal
elements" of the rule are "embedded" in § 8.3 1(a)(2). Id. at 180. If not all of the elements
of the business judgment rule are "embedded" in that section, what was left out? We are
never told. Under the revised Model Act, therefore, a director can fail to adhere to the
standards of conduct set forth in § 8.30 (including the duty of care) and not be liable if he
or she either adheres to the more relaxed standards of § 8.31 or, failing to adhere to § 8.31,
nonetheless complies with the elements of the uncodified business judgment rule. Three
standards, conceivably rather than Norlin's two standards, might now apply to director
conduct.
Prior to being amended in 1998, § 8.30(d) of the MBCA provided "[a] director is not liable
for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties
of his office in compliance with this Section." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(d) (1997). As
indicated in the Official Comment, § 8.30(d) followed former § 35 of the Model Act in pro-
viding that a director is exonerated from liability if he fulfilled the standard set forth in that
section. Id. official comment. The Official Comment goes on to note, however, that if a di-
rector does not comply with the codified standard of conduct, then the application of the busi-
ness judgment rule to the question of director liability must be considered. Id. The above
comment must be read along with an earlier statement in the Official Comment that
[t]he elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its application
are continuing to be developed by the courts. In view of that continuing judicial
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regarded as either a substantive standard for affirmatively guiding judicial
review of director conduct, 22 or a process-oriented standard for guiding
judicial review; 23 and, finally, it is not at all designed for fulfilling the task
(Footnote 21 continued)
development, section 8.30 does not try to codify the business judgment rule or to delineate
the differences, if an) between that rule and the standards of director conduct set forth in this section.
Id. (emphasis added). See e.g., Kreischer v. Kerrison Dry Goods Co., Nos. 97-1230, 97-1800,
1999 WL 30836, at **4 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1999) (applying the South Carolina business judg-
ment rule rather than statutory standard of director conduct, based on language in Model
Act comment). See generally Robert W Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1455 (1985).
The Norlin and Model Act view of the business judgment rule as a more lenient standard
than the duty of care also is the position of the American Law Institute (ALl). See ALI,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANcE]. Section 4.01(c) of the Principles
of Corporate Governance states, in pertinent part, that:
A director ... who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under
this Section if [he or she]:
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the
director.., reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
Id. § 4.0 1(c).
The "duty under this Section" referred to in § 4.01(c) is the duty of care set forth in
§ 4.01(a) of the Principles of Corporate Governance. Section 4.01 (a) requires that a director
act "in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably
be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." Id. § 4.01(a). In
other words, fulfilling the more relaxed business judgment standard set forth in § 4.01(c) is a
way to fulfill the higher duty of care set forth in § 4.01(a). The Principles of Corporate
Governance, in short, functionally regards its codified business judgment rule as a broad-gauged
standard of review, albeit it also sets a substantively lower standard for director conduct than
the duty of care, just as Norlin and the MBCA likewise regard the rule.
22. Samuel Arsht ends his well known analysis of the business judgment rule by very
broadly suggesting it is a term meaning that a plaintiff must prove a decision maker's lack
of good faith and care:
[I]he term "business judgment rule" and the presumption that often identifies it mean
simply that a stockholder who challenges a nonself-dealing transaction must persuade
the court that the corporation's directors, officers, or controlling stockholders in au-
thorizing the transaction did not act in goodfaith, did not act in a manner they reasonably
believed to be in the corporation's best interest, or did not exercise the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 134 (1979)
(emphasis added).
23. Former Chancellor William Allen once stated that "the business judgment rule is
process-oriented." In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del.
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assigned in Cede-organizing judicial fiduciary analysis into an overarch-
ing, seemingly coherent framework.
Properly understood, the business judgment rule is simply a policy of
judicial non-review. Recall the Cede court's statement that "our courts will
not second-guess these business judgments. ' 24 A more modest expression
of the sound statutory and policy bases underlying this judicial deference
to director decisions-as embodied in the business judgment rule-is,
therefore, as follows:
"[W]here money damages or equitable relief is sought, the business
judgment rule is a judicial policy of not reviewing the substantive merits
of a board of directors' business decision for the purpose of determining
whether directors breached or fulfilled their duty of care."
'25
Conversely, courts may review challenged board decisions: (i) for fraud,
illegality, ultra vires, or waste;26 (ii) under a reasonableness test, to ascertain
(a) director compliance with the duty of due care, 27 (b) director compliance
with the Unocal standard, 28 or (c) whether director action was taken in bad
faith;29 and (iii) under an entire fairness test, for the substantive merits of
Ch. 1996). The larger context of that statement indicates that Chancellor Allen was describ-
ing the directors' duty of care as process-oriented and that, to the extent directors fulfilled
the process-oriented duty of care, the business judgment rule would operate to protect the
decision itself. See infra note 32. That relationship between the duty of care and the business
judgment rule, however, does not make the rule itself "process-oriented."
24. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (emphasis added),
mod ifed, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), affd sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d
1156 (Del. 1995).
25. Throughout this Article the formulation in the text is referred to as the "modest
business judgment rule." The rule is "modest" in that, functionally, the business judgment
rule is strictly limited to forbidding judicial review of the substance of business decisions.
The function of the rule thereby is sharply differentiated from the duty of care's broader
inquiry into the reasonableness of the directors' decision-making process. This Article's for-
mulation of the rule, concededly, might be described by some as quite "immodest" in that,
as will be seen, this Article argues for full application of the business judgment rule even in
the breach of care context.
26. See 3A WILLiAm MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1040 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994) [hereinafter FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA].
27. For an extended discussion of a generally applicable "reasonableness" test in the duty
of care area, both where director action involves a considered business judgment and where
director action (or inaction) does not involve making a business decision, see Johnson, supra
note 19.
28. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme
Court held that when a defensive measure is challenged, the board of directors must carry
the initial burden of proving, first, that it has "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed"-a showing which can be made by demon-
strating good faith and a reasonable investigation-and, second, the board must show that
its defensive measure was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955.
29. See Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (noting that
a business decision may be " 'so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
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business decisions, where director loyalty is implicated.
30
Under a proper understanding of the business judgment rule as a policy
of non-review, the "substantive" force of the business judgment rule always
applies in a duty of care case, immunizing the quality of the business de-
cision from judicial review whether or not care was exercised. The ana-
lytical approach of Cede, therefore, where a breach of due care leads only
to application of a different review standard (i.e., entire fairness), is re-
jected. The modest business judgment rule emphasizes that, in the care
setting, proper judicial inquiry into director conduct is process-oriented
and centers on whether a neutral decision maker acted in the proper
manner; 31 that inquiry, unlike a loyalty or bad-faith inquiry, never warrants
judicial scrutiny into the substantive merits of a business decision, as op-
posed to the overall process by which the decision was made. The sub-
stantive "rationality" or "reasonableness" or "fairness" of the business
decision itself is, in the pure care setting, categorically off limits to judicial
review.32 The institutional concern here, as recently observed by a British
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith' " (quoting In reJ.P Stevens &
Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988)); accord West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v.J.P Stevens
& Co. (In reJ.R Stevens & Co.), 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988). The Aronson "abuse
of discretion" standard, see infra note 81, may best be understood as going to director bad
faith. See E. Norman Veasey, New Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors' Business Decisions:
Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAw. 1461, 1473 (1984) ("[I]rrational behavior or an
abuse of discretion, perhaps tantamount to a lack of good faith, would be actionable.").
30. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
31. The Delaware Supreme Court has made strong statements that the due care inquiry
in the business judgment context should focus on a board's decision-making process: "[O]ur
due care examination has focused on a board's decision-making process." Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); see also Brazen v. Bell Ad. Corp.,
695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (dictum); Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project:
Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237, 1240-
42 (1986).
32. Former Chancellor William Allen made the best recent statement about this point:
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or commen-
tators who are not often required to face such questions, is that compliance with a director's
duty of care can never appropriately bejudicially determined by reference to the content of the board
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or
rationality of the process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering the
matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong ex-
tending through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational," provides no ground for director
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational
or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted); see Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 660 (Del. Ch.
1928) (noting that a particular course of action "may argue stupidity," but is no ground for
judicial intervention). Compare the views of another former Chancellor, retired Justice Wil-
liam T Quillen: "WM here can be no question that for years the courts have in fact reviewed
directors' business decisions to some extent from a quality of judgment point of view. Busi-
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commentator, is that "[i]nstead of truly judging directors' behaviour,
[judges] would take bad results as conclusive evidence of bad behaviour."
33
Concern about institutional encroachment arises not only when, as Cede
recognized, plaintiff fails to prove lack of director care, but also, contrary
to Cede, when plaintiff succeeds in proving a breach of due care. Cede, in
short, nullifies half the scope of the business judgment rule-i.e., its ap-
plication in duty-breached cases.
Cede's analytical framework creates confusion, first, by seeming to forget
that the duty of care and the business judgment rule, although comple-
mentary, are two distinct legal concepts serving different roles. Second, by
treating the rule as an all-purpose metric for gauging director liability, Cede
devalues the duty of care. The duty of due care is a legal standard which
specifies the manner in which directors must discharge their duties. 34 The
business judgment rule is a policy of judicial review, or, as this Article sug-
gests, a policy of judicial non-review. The duty of due care unremittingly
requires that, at all times in all corporate settings,3 5 corporate directors
conduct themselves in a particular manner. As most frequently formulated,
the standard of conduct is that a director act with the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances. 36 Whether
making a business judgment or not, the duty demands that a director act
nessmen do not like it, but courts do it and are likely to continue to do it because directors
are fiduciaries." William T Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10
DEL.J. CORP. L. 465, 492 (1985).
33. C.A. Riley, The Company Director's Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous but
Subjective Standard, 62 MODERN L. REV. 697, 710 (1999); accord Hansen, supra note 31, at
1239.
34. See infra notes 35, 36, and accompanying text. Messrs. Balotti and Hanks cogently
differentiate the business judgment rule and the director standard of conduct under Delaware
law, under the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, and under the Model Act. See
Balotti & Hanks, supra note 14, at 1337-39. As to Delaware law, Messrs. Balotti and Hanks
assert that the business judgment rule has "an uncertain nexus" to the director standard of
conduct. Id. at 1338; see 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 26, § 1036 (acknowledging
"some tension" between the business judgment rule and the duty of care).
35. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed the constant and pervasive nature
of director duty as follows: "[F]iduciary duty does not operate intermittently but is the
constant compass by which all director actions for the corporation and interactions with its
shareholders must be guided." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
36. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); NORMAN D.
LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 272 (2d ed. 1971) (explaining that "[t]he common
expression of duty of care is that care which a reasonably prudent director of a similar
corporation would have used under the circumstances of the particular case"); see also PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 4.0 1(a); DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL.,
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE-FIDUCARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 123
n.52 (5th ed. 1998) (collecting representative authority). Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
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with the specified degree of care. The standard of care is context-bound
and cannot be reduced to a task-based notion because it demands all care
"due" in a particular setting. Nonetheless, care by a director includes in-
quiring into and becoming reasonably informed about, deliberating over,
and paying attention to and monitoring, all facets of directing the man-
agement of the corporation's business and affairs.
If plaintiff proves a director did not act with due care, whether from
nonfeasance or misfeasance, that alone is a breach of fiduciary duty and,
absent statutory exoneration,3 7 he or she should be liable for all damages
proximately caused thereby.38 It is not the case, as Cede held, that a proven
breach of care somehow "overrides" the policy of non-review embodied
in the business judgment rule-a policy the Cede court must regard as
highly contingent-and that the rule somehow "falls away" in a breach
case, thereby freeing the judiciary to examine (and possibly uphold) the
substantive quality of a carelessly rendered business decision. 39 The busi-
ness judgment rule, as the name and policy underlying it reflect, is not a
generalized, provisional policy of director non-liability, depending for its
application on director compliance with care but summarily yielding when
care is breached. It is, rather, both a narrow-gauged and quite potent
policy preference designed to preclude judicial scrutiny of business deci-
§ 8.30(a)(2) (1997) (noting "the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances"), with id. § 8.30(b) (1998), in 1997 MBCA Changes, supra
note 21, at 160 (noting "the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe
appropriate under similar circumstances"). For a critique of the customary standard, see
Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention. Time for Reality,
39 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1984). For a critique of the customary standard that the author of this
Article regards as a significant overstatement, see Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business
Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. LAw. 1355,
1374 (1993) ("It now is generally accepted that in a corporate context, the reasonably prudent
person formulation is not only incorrect, but dangerously misleading."). Mr. Hansen's state-
ment is descriptively inaccurate because a majority of states have statutes codifying that
standard. The statement, as a normative position, takes a stance with which many thoughtful
persons disagree, thereby signifying it is not now "generally accepted."
37. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1998) (permitting reduction or
elimination of director liability in certain instances).
38. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 n.27 (Del. Ch. 1996);
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1998) (requiring causation); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 4.01 (d).
39. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994), affd sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del.
1995). For a similar judicial misunderstanding, see Stamp v. Batastini, 636 N.E.2d 616, 621
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("The plaintiff correctly points out that the shield of the business judg-
ment rule is unavailable to directors who fail to exercise due care in their management of
the corporation."). See also Veasey, supra note 29, at 1473.
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sions,40 and this whether directors have or have not breached their dis-
tinctive duty of care.
The contrary Cede position, making the intensity of judicial review to-
ward the merits of the directors' business judgment contingent on whether
directors fulfilled or breached the due care duty, is unprecedented on doc-
trinal grounds,4 1 faulty on a policy basis, and utterly counter to the def-
erence embodied in a modest, but consistently-applied, business judgment
rule. Damages, to be sure, for a breach of due care may be nonexistent
or limited if, among other possibilities, the substantive quality of the chal-
lenged decision is sufficiently good, as it turns out, that little or no harm
was legally caused by director carelessness. Remedial relief, however, is a
distinct consideration from whether courts should substantively examine
business decisions, in the first instance, to assign liability.
The rule, of course, has no application unless a "business judgment"
has been made. 42 Thus, director conduct not involving the exercise of
business judgment-such as an unconsidered failure to monitor corporate
affairs-is reviewed for compliance with the always applicable duty of due
care, but receives no protective shelter under the business judgment rule.
The protection of the rule is grounded on various well known and widely
agreed upon policy rationales. 43 In the garden-variety duty of care area,
moreover, it applies pervasively, not contingently. This means, it bears un-
derscoring, that ifdirectors act in accordance with the applicable standard
of care, then the substantive business decision that results from so acting
will not be judicially reviewed as a basis for faulting directors, just as,
40. Although Messrs. Balotti and Hanks do not develop this point, they rightly emphasize
the need to differentiate director judgments from other director behavior:
A different rubric, however, should be employed to determine whether to impose liability
for a judgment that later turns out to be erroneous than for an act that was not performed
properly. Thus, the deference given to the judgments of the directors-i.e., the substan-
tive aspect of the business judgment rule-prohibits courts from overturning judgments
of the directors.
Balotti and Hanks, supra note 14, at 1344 (emphasis added). This Article contends that the
duty of care is the "different rubric" that always should be applied to director conduct,
whether that conduct involves the making of a judgment or not. Moreover, this Article's
modest business judgment rule serves to differentiate from the always-applicable duty of care
the separate policy preference, applicable only in the judgment context, that the business
judgment of directors is to be accorded judicial deference whether or not directors have, in-
dependently, breached the duty of due care. For a judicial distinction between the standard
of care and the "exercise of judgment" rule in the context of physicians' medical judgment,
see Aiello v. Muhlenberg Regional Medical Center, 733 A.2d 433, 438-42 (NJ. 1999).
41. SeeJohnson, supra note 19.
42. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (explaining that "the business
judgment rule operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has
no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision,
failed to act.").
43. See 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 26, § 1037;Johnson, supra note 19.
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conversely, if directors breach their duty of care a court is not to go on and
assess the substantive fairness of a business decision as a basis for, as in
Cede, absolving a careless director. Consequently, if directors comply with
the applicable standard of care but, in spite of so acting, make an unrea-
sonable, unwise, or even downright stupid business decision, the merits of
that decision will not factor into judicial assessment of director compliance
with legal duties. 44 Likewise, when directors breach the applicable stan-
dard of care, the merits of the resulting decision (except concerning dam-
ages) ought not enter into judicial assessment of director conduct. 45 This
outcome reflects the sensible symmetry of deference that undergirds the
modest business judgment rule's narrow-banded, but constant, policy of
non-review.
The relationship between, on the one hand, the far-reaching, always-
applicable director duty of due care and, on the other hand, the more
finely drawn policy of non-review housed in the business judgment rule,
is one of the most important, but least understood, relationships in cor-
porate law. Why do Aronson and Cede both miscapture that relationship?
44. See supra note 32. This sound policy of not assessing a director's compliance with the
due care duty by making reference to the merits of the business decision itself finds expression
in the instructive language of Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(citations omitted):
Mistakes in the exercise of honest business judgment do not subject the directors to
liability for negligence in the discharge of their fiduciary duties. The standard [of care]
is one of reasonable diligence, not the utmost amount of diligence. ... The law rec-
ognizes that no director is infallible and that he will make mistakes, but if he is honest
and uses reasonable diligence he will be absolved from liability although his opinion
may turn out to have been mistaken and his judgment faulty.
This statement makes clear, first, that the standard of care for directors is reasonable
diligence and, second, that the merits of a business decision are not examined as a basis for
determining compliance or noncompliance with that standard for the reason that a mistake
in judgment simply is not regarded, by itself, as a breach of the relevant care standard. See
also Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 E Supp. 238, 258 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(finding that "application of the business judgment rule does not alter the statutory require-
ment ... that directors or officers act with reasonable care so that they may be held liable
for negligence").
45. The reason for this result is that, where directors breach the process-oriented duty of
due care, that breach, by itself, creates liability for those resulting business decisions causing
damage. The breach of care is not undone or atoned for by the merits of the business decision
itself. As stated by a commentator sixty years ago:
While honest managerial mistakes will not be penalized by the law, the courts are looking
with disfavor upon blundering directors, whose errors grew out of their carelessness.
Cases have therefore been frequent where corporate directors were held liable for mis-
takes of judgment which were caused by their failure to exercise proper care and diligence.
Rudolph E. Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Judgment, 20 B.U. L.
REV. 488, 491 (1940) (emphasis added).
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DELA WARE'S BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
DEVELOPED SEPARATELY FROM DUE CARE
THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF, AD RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN, THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
Courts and commentators frequently have addressed what they see as
the relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
For example, several decades ago Professor Ballantine stated: "Mt is pre-
supposed in this 'business judgment rule' that reasonable diligence and
care have been exercised." 46 Samuel Arsht, writing twenty years ago, like-
wise stressed that decisional law required a director to exercise "reasonable
diligence and care" 47 as a precondition to judicial deference to director
judgment. Two representative judicial statements, one fairly recent and
another 150 years old, also reflect this viewpoint: "The business judg-
ment rule protects directors from liability for good faith errors only after
the directors have exercised reasonable care in fulfilling their corporate
obligations." ,
48
[I]f the [directors'] mistake be such as with proper care might have
been avoided, they ought to be liable. If, on the other hand, the
mistake be such as the directors might well make, notwithstanding
the exercise of proper care, and if they acted in good faith and for
the benefit of the [corporation], they ought not to be liable.
49
All of the authority above sharply differentiates the director duty of
care from the business judgment rule, while at the same time acknowledg-
ing, however incompletely, their relationship. Professor Ballantine, Samuel
Arsht, and the Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess5° opinion underscore, like the
Cede5' case, one way in which the substantive protection of the business
judgment rule is obtained, that is, upon the plaintiff's failure to prove a
director breach of care. Without such proof of breach, because directors
themselves have no affirmative burden of persuasion that theyfufiled their
duty of care, they will rightly be "presumed" to have acted with care.
46. HENRY W BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 63a, at 161 (rev. ed. 1946).
47. Arsht, supra note 22, at 100.
48. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 820 E Supp. 1359, 1367 (D. Utah 1993) (describing
Utah law).
49. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 346 (1850); see Hansen Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 E2d 264, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing authority differen-
tiating process-oriented due care inquiry from substantive judicial review of substance of
business decision).
50. 820 F Supp. at 1359; see supra notes 46-48.
51. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modfied, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del.
1995).
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Accordingly, the policy of non-review found in the business judgment rule
will foreclose judicial inquiry into the substantive merits of the decision as
an independent basis for holding directors liable. The last sentence of the
quote from the Hodges v. New England Screw Co.52 decision, like authority
cited earlier,53 makes crystal clear the point that inquiry into the substance
of business decisions will not becloud the duty of care inquiry.
The excerpt from the Hodges case, while supporting the point made
above by the other authorities, makes a further point not clearly made by
the others. That point, albeit made tersely, is often overlooked. It is that
directors should be liable for damages caused by decisions not made with
proper care.54 Here the focus is pointedly the legal duty of director care,
its breach being sufficient by itself to create liability, without regard to a
further, judicial assessment of the business decision's substantive quality,
except as is pertinent to damages.
This latter facet of a modest business judgment rule immunizes director
business decisions from judicial scrutiny in the care context when directors
fail to act with care as surely as when they succeed in acting with care. To
be complete and consistent, the business judgment rule policy of non-
review should apply in the duty-breached as well as in the duty-fulfilled
settings; in neither setting should the directors' substantive business judg-
ment enter into and muddy the separate duty of care analysis. The modest
business judgment rule described earlier readily accomplishes this; the Cede
holdings do not. That is, Cede punctures the protective shelter of the busi-
ness judgment rule by invasively scrutinizing for fairness the substance of
director decisions in a duty of care case involving the exercise of business
judgment. Lacking a clear doctrinal and functional firebreak between the
duty of care's rightful province and the business judgment rule's separate
province, the court blurs the two concepts by treating a breach of the
former as grounds for nullifying application of the latter. This would be
unnecessary if Delaware had a robust, well developed duty of care the
juridical domain of which was more strictly demarcated from the narrow
ambit of the business judgment rule, and the breach of which, by itself,
was thought to be serious enough to create liability for resulting damages. 55
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 32, 44, and accompanying text.
54. Both decisions cited by Professor Ballantine, see supra note 46 and accompanying text,
support this point. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43, 647 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
supra note 44. The other decision is Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F Supp. 905 (E.D.
Pa. 1945), affd, 155 F 2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946), where the court stated that " 'the failure to
observe this standard of care [of reasonable, ordinary care and diligence] imposes liability
on a defaulting director.' " Id. at 911 (quoting Fell v. Pitts, 106 A. 574, 576 (Pa. 1919) (holding
directors liable)); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
55. Cede, in other words, treats a duty of care breach as non-liability creating, not, as is
the case with Norlin, the ALI, and the Model Act, see supra note 21, because of the business
judgment rule, but in spite ofit.
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DELAWARE'S LONGSTANDING SEPARATION, AND
EVENTUAL JOINING, OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
Unlike the authority cited above, Delaware courts appear to have ini-
tially developed the concept of the business judgment rule without directly
linking it, functionally or doctrinally, to the director duty of due care. This
is not surprising given that the Delaware Supreme Court did not even
explicitly acknowledge such a duty until 1963.56 Even today, Delaware
refuses to expound a robust, all-encompassing duty of due care, an odd
failing that continues to distinguish Delaware law. Instead, with a few
exceptions that deserve more attention,5 7 Delaware courts tend, more or
less, to equate that key duty with a duty to be informed, a critical but less
full-bodied duty than due care.
58
Lacking an express and vigorous duty of care, Delaware developed its
"business judgment" jurisprudence earlier than, and independent of, the
doctrinal emergence of that fiduciary duty. Although the phrase "business
judgment rule" apparently was not used by the Delaware Chancery Court
until 1959,59 the phrase "business judgment"-and the concept of the
rule itself-had been in use for several decades.
60
What is striking about the Delaware judiciary's early verbal expression
of the business judgment concept is its similarity, save for one element, to
the 1984 Aronson formulation. For example, in 1928, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court stated as follows:
The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of
a presumption that it was formed in good faith and was designed to
promote the best interests of the corporation they serve . . . . "If .. .there
is nothing to show that the directors did not exercise their discretion
56. See supra note 3.
57. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48
(Del. 1994) (describing the corporate director as having a two-fold duty "to obtain, and act
with due care on, all material information reasonably available"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (describing the director's duty to exercise an informedjudgment
as "in the nature of a duty of care," not the duty of care (emphasis added)). Elsewhere,
Chief Justice Veasey rightly refrains from equating care and informedness by describing care
as including (but not being limited to) informedness: "The duty of care includes the require-
ment that directors inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to
them before making a business decision." E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate
Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAW. 393, 397-98 (1997).
58. See e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989)
(noting the business judgment rule "creates a 'presumption that in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care]' " (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
59. See Nadler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 154 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. Ch. 1959).
60. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952); Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 660 (Del. Ch. 1928) (stating that "I can see no
justification in this court's interfering. It is a matter of business judgment ....").
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for what they believed to be the best interest of the corporation, certainly an
honest mistake of business judgment should not be reviewable by the
court."
6 1
Compare the above with the more compact Aronson expression of similar
elements, i.e., that there is a "presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in goodfaith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com-
pany.' '62 Two of the three Aronson elements-good faith and honest belief
that the decision was in the best interests of the corporation-existed as
part of the business judgment concept as early as 1928.
In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court cites as authority for its for-
mulation of what it calls the business judgment rule not its own decisions,
but two Chancery Court opinions, one decided in 1971 and another from
1924. The 1971 decision referred to in Aronson-Kaplan v. Centex Corpora-
tion 63-cited as authority for its business judgment rule formulation a 1966
Delaware Supreme Court decision which, after stating that the "acts of
directors are presumptively acts taken in good faith and inspired for the best
interests of the corporation,"64 cited yet another Chancery Court decision ren-
dered in 1943.65 The 1943 decision, in turn, referenced a 1931 Chancery
Court decision, 66 which cited both the 1928 Chancery Court decision
quoted above67 and the 1924 Chancery Court decision 68 relied on directly
by Aronson.
69
In all of these decisions undergirding Aronson-running from Kaplan
through each case cited above, back to the wellspring decisions of Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,70 Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.,71 and
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp.7 2-the two elements of good faith
and honest belief as to the corporation's best interests are present. What
is conspicuously missing from all these formulations, however, is the first
Aronson element, that of being "informed." The 1971 Kaplan case states
that the business judgment rule "of necessity depends upon a showing that
informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment."7 3 Although
61. Davis, 142 A. at 659 (emphasis added) (quoting Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp.,
140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927)).
62. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
63. 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971).
64. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (Del. 1966) (emphasis added).
65. See Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Del. Ch. 1943).
66. See Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931).
67. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
68. See Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch. 1924).
69. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
70. 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928).
71. 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927).
72. 126 A. at 46.
73. Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
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the emphasis in that phrase seems less on the word "informed" and more
on the necessity of a judgment being made in order for the protection of
the rule to operate, three years later, citing Kaplan, the Chancery Court
nevertheless described the "presumption of having made an informed
judgment in good faith."
'74
The eventual incorporation of the "informed" element into Delaware's
business judgment rule, coupled with the notable lack of direct historical
linkage between that rule and the duty of care, raises two obvious ques-
tions. Is the "informed" element simply one aspect of, or is it the same as,
the concept of due care? Is injection of the "informed" element into the
Aronson formulation meant to add in Delaware what Professor Ballantine,
Samuel Arsht, and much decisional law had described, essentially, as a
precondition to the substantive protection of the business judgment rule,
i.e., the exercise of due care?
There is no assertion in the Aronson, Muschel, Kaplan, or Beard decisions
themselves that the "informed" element originally was conceived of as
being coextensive with due care. That certainly would be a strained read-
ing of the 1960 Beard decision which predates by three years the Delaware
Supreme Court's first express acknowledgment of director care by means
of a commonplace formulation phrased quite differently than a mere duty
to be "informed. '75 Aronson itself, moreover, appears to differentiate be-
tween a director becoming informed and a director acting with care, stat-
ing that "[h] aving become so informed, they [directors] must then act with
requisite care in the discharge of their duties."'76 Aronson also, however,
follows Professor Ballantine, Samuel Arsht, and certain decisional law in
wrongly predicating the substantive shelter of the business judgment rule
on director informedness, stating that "to invoke the rule's protection di-
rectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business de-
cision, of all material information reasonably available to them. ' 77 Thus,
Aronson, on the one hand, rightly distinguishes informedness and care; on
the other hand, the court wrongly pre-conditions application of the busi-
ness judgment rule on informedness, thereby suggesting many years before
74. Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 906, 909 (Del. Ch. 1973). Although
not cited by Aronson or Kaplan, an even earlier emphasis on the importance of directors being
informed can be found in Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) (stating that where
directors who were "fully informed, could well differ in opinion, then the sound business
judgment rule required the court to approve the plan").
75. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (noting that
"it appears that directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to
use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances"); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
76. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (emphasis added). This distinction
is occasionally, but not always, maintained, see supra notes 57-58, and accompanying text.
77. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Veasey, supra note 29, at 1464 ("Simply stated, the
director forfeits the benefit of the business judgment rule as a defense if he or she has violated
the proper duty of loyalty and the proper duty of care.").
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Cede that the judiciary may examine the substance of director judgments
not made on an informed basis. Furthermore, although Aronson regards
the duty to be informed as a pre-condition to invocation of the business
judgment rule, a breach of the duty to be informed apparently was not
thought in 1984 to be sufficiently important, by itself, to create liability for
the breaching director. At least the Aronson court failed to develop the
liability implications of such a breach. Lack of informedness alone, for
the Aronson court, like breach of due care for the Cede court years later,
may not have created liability, but inexplicably, it apparently did free courts
to substantively examine business decisions under some standard as yet
unspecified in 1984.78 Viewed this way, the seeds of Cede's analytical linking
of a director due care breach to entire fairness review actually were sown
in Aronson.
Whatever the initial intent or origins, fifteen years of decisional law since
Aronson make clear that the "informed" element too frequently is equated
with care. 79 That "shrinking" of due care to being informed is problematic
enough on substantive policy grounds, and leads to a bifurcated rather
than singular notion of care, one for the business judgment context and
another for the non-judgment context. 80 The chief point here, however,
is how, historically and doctrinally, the Delaware business judgment rule
both preceded articulation of the due care duty and later enveloped care
78. The Delaware Supreme Court may have thought the only alternative to "business
judgment" review in Delaware was "entire fairness" because in 1984 Delaware had not fully
developed an intermediate "reasonableness" test as among its repertoire of standards. The
1995 Delaware Supreme Court Cede opinion interpreted the 1985 decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), as holding that entire fairness is the proper standard where
directors are not informed prior to making a business judgment. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Tech-
nicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995). At least that is the case, according to Cinerama,
where the director failure to be informed is accompanied by a breach of the duty of disclo-
sure. See id. This 1995 interpretation of the 1985 Van Gorkom decision partially supplies an
answer to a question invited by the Aronson dictum that directors must be informed to invoke
the business judgment rule, namely, what standard of review applies where directors are not
so informed?
79. See supra note 58. See generally Johnson, supra note 19.
80. Both the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 4.01 and the
Model Act make clear that director care in the decision-making context is to be differentiated
from care in the oversight context. For example, the Model Act's revised § 8.30(b) formulates
director care in the decision-making context as applying only "when" a director is "becoming
informed" and formulates care in the oversight context as applying only "when" directors
are "devoting attention." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1998), in 1997 MBCA Changes,
supra note 2 1, at 160. In other words, apparently directors are not generally required to act
with care, but are required to do so only "when" "becoming informed" and "when" "de-
voting attention." See supra note 21. To more broadly express the duty of care, the second
clause of revised § 8.30(b) should state: "in connection with their decision-making and over-
sight functions." Given the distinction between "standards of conduct" and "standards of
liability" in the revised Model Act, see supra note 21, the downgrading and weakening of care
in new § 8.30 is quite puzzling, inasmuch as breach of that section, unlike § 8.31, lacks liability
"bite" anyway.
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(in the sense of being "informed") within the Aronson formulation of the
rule,8 1 thereby "triumphing," if you will, over the duty of care as the more
preeminent and central corporate law precept in Delaware. 82 The duty of
care, a doctrinal latecomer in Delaware, rather quickly was methodolog-
ically and analytically subsumed within the edifice of the business judg-
ment rule, the rule itself remaining the intellectual centerpiece. This
sweeping role for the business judgment rule may be precisely what both
Samuel Arsht, in his important reprise on the rule,
83 andJustice Horsey,84
author of the 1993 Cede opinion, envisioned for the rule.
Perhaps the late emergence, and thinness, of the due care concept in
Delaware made this fusion of care and a robust business judgment rule
less obvious or bothersome than might otherwise have been the case. No
one, to be sure, can fault the requirement that directors be informed before
exercising judgment. It is unfortunate, however, to stunt the growth of a
vigorous, all-encompassing duty of due care by delimiting that core duty
to a duty to "be informed. ' 85 It is even more unfortunate, once a duty of
81. Aronson's functional conflating of the duty of due care and the business judgment rule
is captured in the following sentence where the court abruptly shifts from care to the business
judgment rule: "While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
Further confusion results when the court switches from having used the term "standard" in
conjunction with care in the above-quoted text of the opinion to using the same term, in a
companion footnote, in conjunction with business judgment: "While the Delaware cases have
not been precise in articulating the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is governed, a
long line of Delaware cases holds that director liability is predicated on a standard which is
less exacting than simple negligence." Id. at 812 n.6 (emphasis added). The court then cites
cases articulating "fraud," "gross overreaching," and "abuse of discretion" standards, all of
which go more to the substantive extremeness of the directors' decisions themselves than to
the care of the decision-making process. See supra notes 29, 31.
82. The Chancellor, in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1141 (Del. Ch.
1994), stated that "the law of fiduciary duties of corporate directors is older and more basic
than the modernly popular 'business judgment rule.' " The Chancellor's assertion is not
inconsistent with the point made in the text of this Article. The point in the text is not that
Delaware directors have not long been under fiduciary duties, but rather that explicit artic-
ulation of the care duty emerged fairly recently and that, the Chancellor's statement not-
withstanding, the concept of the business judgment rule in Delaware bothprecededarticulation
of that duty and subsequently has enveloped care within its formulation. One of the aims of
this Article is to dislodge care from the rubric of the business judgment rule and return it to
the more basic role contemplated for it by the Chancellor.
83. See Arsht, supra note 22, at 111-12, 114, 118-21 (discussing the substance of the busi-
ness judgment rule and its broad role in Delaware law).
84. See Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment
Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971 (1994). Justice Horsey's article was published several months
after the 1993 Cede opinion and the year before the 1995 Cede opinion.
85. No doubt the heated reaction to Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and
the resulting enactment of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1998) were instrumental
in this. Quite apart from the soundness or unsoundness of Van Gorkom's ruling on the facts,
viewed historically, the Delaware Supreme Court, having finally formulated the "informed"
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care began haltingly to emerge in Delaware, that the notion was not al-
lowed to develop independently-and its violation treated meaningfully
by creating liability-rather than being encased as a "component" of the
business judgment rule.86 The eventual upshot of this odd conjoining of
the duty of due care and the business judgment rule review standard is Cede's
holding that although breach of the former duty leads, methodologically,
only to loss of the latter's review standard, the exacting "fairness" standard
is thereupon illogically applied to assess director conduct that at most
should be measured for compliance with a "reasonable" or "prudent"
standard. This analytical move diminishes the independent, functional sig-
nificance of due care for fiduciary conduct, while, at the same time, it
inappropriately applies a too-demanding fairness standard upon its
breach. This functional downgrading of due care, coupled with judicial
encroachment into substance, reflects the functional immodesty of Dela-
ware's business judgment rule as an analytical construct. It is also exactly
the reverse of healthy corporate law.
It is quite clear, therefore, that, in Delaware at least, the business judg-
ment rule is by no means "modest" in its analytical sweep. Far from being
simply a judicial policy of non-review, it augmented in the 1980s and
1990s the prominence it had in the decades before the express emergence
of care and actually became the unifying prism through which baseline
director duties are examined. Viewed this way, Cede was the inexorable
culmination of the post-Aronson effort to unify fiduciary analysis under the
auspices of the business judgment rule, a herculean task for which the rule
was never designed. One striking irony of this "immodest" business judg-
ment rule, however, is that it actually fails to protect from judicial review
that category of business decisions where directors were not informed-
i.e., in the duty-breached setting. Under this Article's more "modest" busi-
ness judgment rule, which simultaneously treats breaches of due care (or,
minimally, failures of informedness) as independent wrongs creating lia-
bility, no such judicial incursion into business judgment is called for or
allowed. In this sense, the "modest" business judgment rule more faithfully
honors the policy core of the rule than does Delaware's more "immodest"
version.
8 7
element in Aronson many decades after other courts had verbally linked due care and the
business judgment rule, at some point was going to apply that overdue element in a mean-
ingful fashion. What is striking about Van Gorkom, again viewed historically, is both that the
importance of care was so late in being vigorously expressed and that reaction to the decision
was so swifl as to result, two years later, in statutory authorization to exculpate directors from
liability for all care breaches.
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See Manning, supra note 36, at 1491 ("The heart of the business judgment rule has
always been a recognition by the courts that business decisions should not be evaluated
retrospectively"); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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DRAWBACKS OF AN IMMODEST BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
Cede's analytical framework is novel. It also is probably the inevitable
outcome of Delaware's double response to the late emergence of the due
care duty The two responses-substantively short-circuiting fuller growth
of care by too quickly equating it with informedness and methodologically
subsuming care within the business judgment rule framework-each mu-
tually and negatively reinforce each other. That is, the subsuming of care
allows continuation of an overly broad business judgment rule as the cen-
terpiece of fiduciary analysis, while the continuing immodesty of the busi-
ness judgment rule inhibits healthy independent growth of the due care
duty. The Cede framework both reflects and perpetuates this problematic
relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
This, no doubt, contributes to the chronic lack of resolution to what two
expert commentators on Delaware corporate law have politely described
as the "uncertain nexus" between the business judgment rule and director
duties.88
Having added the third "informedness" element to its business rule in
Aronson, the court in Cede equated that element with care and treated its
breach identically to breaches of good faith and loyalty. This accounts for
the following key statement in Cede:
[A] shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence
that directors, in reaching their challenged decisions, breached any
one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due
care. If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant direc-
tors ... to prove ... the "entire fairness " of the transaction .... 
89
Treating breaches of care, good faith, and loyalty similarly may create
a superficial uniformity of analysis, but it generates many problems as
well. First, the analysis of care and loyalty claims is not really similar. With
respect to loyalty, the plaintiff must properly raise a loyalty concern, but
having done so need not prove a breach of that duty.90 Rather, upon
director loyalty properly being brought into issue, the burden of proof
shifts to the self-interested director(s) for the purpose of convincing a court
88. Balotti and Hanks, supra note 14, at 1338.
89. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted)
(first emphasis added).
90. As stated by the Delaware Supreme Court: "When a board of directors' loyalty is
questioned, Delaware courts determine whether a conflict has deprived the stockholders of
a 'neutral decision-making body.' " Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1170
(Del. 1995). Where a majority of directors is interested in a matter, the board is not a "neutral
decision-making body." See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994) (noting that "where actual self-interest is present and affects
a majority of the directors approving a transaction, a court will apply [the entire fairness
test] ").
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that, because the transaction was entirely fair,9 1 the duty of loyalty was
fulfilled, not breached. The burden shift precedes, rather than follows, an
ultimate finding on breach or fulfillment of that duty.
The same is not true with care. Here plaintiff must do more than call
care into question; plaintiff must prove a duty of care breach, whereupon,
under Cede, the burden shifts to the director(s) to prove the entire fairness
of the transaction.92 Unlike the case with loyalty, the burden shiftfollows,
rather than precedes, the finding of breach of that particular duty. Thus,
the consequences of a breach of the duty of care are different than the
consequences of a breach of the duty of loyalty. The former is not outcome
determinative while the latter is. 93 Cede's uniformity of analysis, therefore,
is more apparent than real.
Second, this asymmetric treatment of duty breaches stems from failure
to apply, fully, the business judgment rule in a duty-breached context.
Courts, including Cede, rightly apply half the business judgment rule in
holding that, where directorsfuill their care duty, a court should not re-
view the substantive merits of the business decision as a separate basis
either for upsetting that decision or holding directors personally liable for
a "bad" decision. Courts, including Cede, however, too infrequently apply
the other half of the modest business judgment rule in failing to hold that,
where directors breach their care duty, a court likewise should (and need)
not review the substantive merits of the business decision as a separate
basis for upholding the decision or absolving directors of liability for a
"good" (or "fair") decision. The same policy rationales for judicial non-
intervention into review of business decisions in the one care setting re-
main fully in force in the other setting as well. The real issue in the duty-
breached context where there is an admitted failure to fulfill care-an
already established independent wrong-is whether that breach will be
taken seriously by holding that such a breach in and of itself creates lia-
bility. That issue should be faced openly by disentangling care from the
91. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1172.
92. See id. at 1163.
93. In the 1995 Cede opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court makes clear that although
the 1993 Cede opinion had held that directors had breached their duty of care-thereby
denying defendants the procedural and substantive protection of the business judgment
rule-the court in 1993 had not decided whether the directors had violated the duty of
loyalty. See id. at 1165-66. This point, coupled with longstanding law in Delaware that entire
fairness review is applied when director loyalty is sufficiently challenged not when the duty of
loyalty actually has been found to have been breached, reveals the error of Cede's assertion that
to rebut the business judgment rule plaintiff must provide evidence that directors breached
their duty of loyalty. It is not necessary that a court make a finding that directors actually
breached the duty of loyalty prior to applying the entire fairness standard of review. In Cede
itself, however, plaintiffs proof of an actual breach of due care by directors was necessary
to alter the standard of review to an entire fairness standard. The court, therefore, wrongly
equates the showings that must be made in the care and loyalty areas in order to apply the
entire fairness standard.
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business judgment construct. If liability is held to result, ensuing remedial
relief then turns on plaintiff proving damages as a proximate cause of the
breach or establishing the conditions for equitable relief.
94
Third, failure to apply fully the modest business judgment rule-recal-
ling that rule as a pervasive policy of non-review-in a duty-breached
context serves to denigrate breaches of care and thereby further weaken
that already frail duty. Understanding the duty of care as a vital and
independent duty of directors, not merely a "component" of the Aronsoni
Cede business judgment rule,95 will lead to breaches of that duty being
treated as wrongs in and of themselves, not simply as triggers for effecting
a burden shift and a concomitant dropping of judicial inhibitions against
examining the merits of business decisions. The Aronson /Cede formulation-
framework, in short, simultaneously serves to downgrade care breaches in
Delaware while also subjecting director decisions to close substantive re-
view in a way that nullifies full application of a properly modest business
judgment rule.
96
Fourth, this belittling of care detracts from efforts to emphasize both
the significance and reach of the duty of care. Unlike the business judg-
ment rule, which by its terms has no application where directors exercise
no business judgment,97 the duty of care is a pervasive duty governing
directors at all times, even when they are not exercising business judg-
ments.98 For this reason, due care should not rhetorically or analytically
be conceived of as a "component" of (or mere precondition to) the busi-
ness judgment rule because the latter operates in a far narrower province
than care. For example, a breach of the duty of care resulting from faulty
director monitoring of corporate affairs, where no identifiable business
judgment was made, simply does not fit into a formulation that analytically
subsumes the richer duty of care under the more confined business judg-
ment context. Ironically, this serves to splinter, not unify, efforts to reinvig-
orate care as a robust and foundational duty coherently applying in both
judgment and non-judgment contexts.99
94. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 464 (1993) (stating that "a director who makes a
disinterested decision will be subject to a due-care rather than a rationality standard of review
if the requirements of the business-judgment rule are not satisfied"). After Cede, such a
director will not be subjected to the "reasonable" and "prudent" standard of due care, but
to an "entire fairness" standard formerly reserved for loyalty claims.
97. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
99. Some commentators believe the modern duty of care has been drained of meaningful
ability to constrain fiduciary conduct. See, e.g. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAw § 8.05 (1999) (discussing "The Demise of the Duty of
Care"); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover,
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Fifth, Cede's burden shift and entire fairness approach to a care breach
simply led to a judicial assessment of factors which should have been done
as part of a more thorough threshold duty of care analysis.100 Recognizing
the care-like nature of the factors it was evaluating in its entire fairness
review, 0 1 the court could only rationalize its two-stage care analysis by
stating that the "degree of procedural due care a board of directors ex-
ercises has been recognized as a continuing component of an entire fair-
ness analysis."' 1 2 What later comprised the court's "fair dealing" portion
of its entire fairness analysis should have been done as part of the initial
due care inquiry. This more thorough care assessment at the outset would
have splendidly highlighted that due care encompasses more than the Aron-
son element of informedness. It also would have more efficiently resulted
in what should have been an earlier finding of no duty of care breach in
that case, or at least none causing damages. As it is, the court eventually
found director compliance with a strict entire fairness test after first finding
a director care breach under a more deferential standard. 103 This revisiting
of care under the rubric of entire fairness obscures rather than clarifies
the distinctive contours of the due care duty. Care is only diminished as
a result.
Finally, the Cede framework ignores the underpinnings for judicial def-
erence in the care area, in contrast to the loyalty area. A key rationale for
judicial deference in the care area is the perceived institutional impropriety
of public officials evaluating the substantive quality of private sector busi-
ness decisions. The absence of Aronson's informedness element alone, or
even an affirmative showing by plaintiff of unreasonableness in the overall
decision-making process, does not warrant a court in supplanting a board
of directors and passing its own judgment-usually long after the fact-
on the substantive merits of a business decision. Two matters are trouble-
some in this regard. First, the legislatively enacted corporations statute
places the business and affairs of a corporation under the "direction" of
a board of directors, not a court. 04 Failure of a board to act with requisite
54 Bus. LAw. 885, 918 (1999) ("MThe traditional [procedurally] based legal duty of care
... [has] led not to more effective management oversight but, instead, to a classic triumph
of form over function-where, although prescribed procedure has been followed, decision-
making appears to be little more than staged play-acting, absent critical engaged oversight.").
Compare Riley, supra note 33, with Eisenberg, supra note 96, andJohnson, supra note 19 (each
seeking to reclaim for corporate law the value of the due care duty).
100. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1172-80 (Del. 1995).
101. The court approved the Court of Chancery's consideration of the directors' "now
undisputed lack of care" along with its consideration of how the directors "had carefully"
acted in other ways. Thus, the directors had demonstrated both a "lack of care" and had
acted "carefully." See id. at 1175.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1179-80.
104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); see also Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro,
721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960) ("We think,
therefore, we are precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced
business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the outcome.").
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care in discharging this statutory responsibility neither transfers this re-
sponsibility to the judiciary nor is the failure negated by a judicial conclu-
sion that the ultimate outcome was, after all, "fair." Second, although the
duty of care mandates only that directors act with reasonable prudence
(whether understood as informedness or as a richer "due care" notion), a
director found to have breached that duty is saddled, after Cede, with the
further, unexpected duty of proving that what was done was "entirely fair."
The ex post judicial review standard of fairness, therefore, is more de-
manding than the ex ante duty to act with care. A director acting in good
faith and having no disqualifying self-interest in a matter may rightly be-
lieve his or her only remaining duty is to act carefully. Yet, Cede tells a
director that, upon a judicial finding of breach of care, having acted fairly
will atone for the care breach, 10 5 possibly leading some directors to believe,
out of caution, that the ex ante duty of care is best regarded as including
a fallback duty to act fairly. The judicial review standard, therefore, indirectly
may raise the director standard of conduct. 10 6 The result may be overly
cautious business behavior aimed at avoiding transactions that directors
cannot confidently conclude are substantively "fair," and overly cautious
decision-making behavior so as to comply with the "fair dealing" aspect of
entire fairness.
Care cases, unlike loyalty cases, do not deprive corporations of a "neu-
tral decision-making body" 107 The prevailing loyalty rationale for judicial
assessment of the substantive fairness of business decisions, therefore, does
not obtain in care cases, even where care is breached. Consequently a
care breach, contrary to what Cede holds, should not result in judicial
review of substance. At the same time, a care breach should have more than
Cede's burden-shifting procedural effect; it should have substantive force. It
is in this sense that the substantive force of the modest business judgment
rule always applies in a care case, immunizing the quality of the decision
from judicial review whether or not care was exercised. In the care setting
involving the exercise of business judgment, the proper inquiry is, instead,
whether an undoubtedly neutral decision maker acted in a reasonably
prudent manner, that investigation does not ever necessitate or warrant
judicial inquiry into the substantive merits of a decision, only (but no less
than) a probing inquiry into the process by which it was made. 108 Whether
the decision-making process is found to be sound or unsound, the court is
not to pass on the substantive merits of the actual business decision.
105. See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1175.
106. In Professor Eisenberg's terminology, this is a peculiar instance of "divergence," see
Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 438, between a standard of conduct and a standard of review
where the latter, being higher, may effectively raise the former.
107. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991), quoted in Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at
1170.
108. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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If the directors' decision-making process was sound, the court looks at
the business decision itself only to verify a linkage between process and
outcome. Importantly, the inquiry is not an examination of substance-
even for minimal rationality 9-but only of whether the decision actually
made was a "rational outcome of" the decision-making process actually
undertaken. Put another way, the court asks whether there is a "rational
connection between" the sound process actually undertaken and the de-
cision actually reached." 10 This mild requirement avoids a complete dis-
junction between process and outcome. If, on the other hand, the process
is defective, directors will be liable without regard to decisional quality-
on the rationale that judicial views of decisional quality are irrelevant in
the care area-for all damages proximately caused by their carelessness,
excepting only rescissory damages.I' To reduce liability exposure, direc-
tors can seek ex ante shareholder exculpation from damages," 2 or, not-
withstanding the breach of care, they can defend against an award of
damages or equitable relief by extolling the "fair" economic merits of
their decision as negating the existence of any harm from their breach.
Cede adopted its uniform analysis of fiduciary duty breaches with no
attention to these fundamental differences between judicial review of care
and loyalty. A modest business judgment rule would highlight, rather than
obscure, these importance differences.
CONCLUSION
The duty of due care and the business judgment rule oftentimes seem
hopelessly entangled. Why try to untangle them? After all, corporate law
and the corporate institution seem to be flourishing at the beginning of a
new century.
The history of legal thought teaches us that sometimes analytical con-
structs enhance our understanding of social phenomena and sometimes
they impede it. Whether the duty of due care and the business judgment
rule need sorting out depends, ultimately, on how important a strong,
distinctive duty of due care is thought to be for contemporary corporate
law. A rhetorical mainstay of corporate law for decades outside Delaware,
due care in Delaware emerged rather recently. Once it was analytically
109. Thus, the "any rational business purpose" requirement of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), and of PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 21, § 4.0 1(c) is inappropriate and unnecessary under a modest business judgment rule
which, simultaneously, takes due care seriously See supra note 32.
110. The "rational connection" expression is an administrative law notion, requiring that
an agency offer a linkage ("rational connection") between its findings and its decision. See
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
111. Chancellor Allen forcefully argued against awarding rescissory damages in a duty of
care case. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1144-50 (Del. Ch. 1994),
aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
112. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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expressed in Aronson and applied with force in Van Gorkom, a statutory opt-
out of liability for its breach was quickly provided. Meanwhile, in the
statutory law of other business associations-such as partnerships and lim-
ited liability companies-the duty of care wholly lost its affirmative thrust
and was reduced to a "duty to refrain" from grossly negligent (or worse)
behavior,'1 3 a duty that neither inspires nor packs much legal punch.
One response to this decades-long development is to assert that modern
corporate law (along with partnership and LLC law) now treats the con-
cept of due care in a way that more closely reflects good policy. This
amounts, frankly, to a view that care's role in corporate law has been
overstated all along. Another response-Professor Eisenberg'sI 14-is to
maintain care's importance by conceiving of it as a "standard of conduct"
though not a "standard of review" carrying liability "bite." Among other
problems with that account, as a standard of conduct due care remains a
pre-condition to the business judgment standard of review, meaning di-
rector care is reviewed for compliance with a standard of conduct. This looks
like more "convergence" than "divergence." Moreover, notwithstanding
the revised Model Act's supposed reliance on Professor Eisenberg's "di-
vergence" account," 5 the Act proceeds to weaken the traditional care
formulation (section 8.30) and adopt a lower standard of liability/review
(section 8.31) that may still be higher than the uncodified business judg-
ment rule, thereby suggesting that the divergence account does not fully
capture positive law developments. The same can be said for developments
in partnership and LLC formulations of the duty of care, with their dictate
that decision makers must act only in a way that avoids violation of the
legal liability standard.
Against that backdrop, the purpose of this Article is simple. It contends
that the place of due care in corporate law-whether central or mar-
ginal-is best addressed head-on. To facilitate this, the duty of due care,
in formulation and function, should be differentiated from the single-focus
policy expressed in the business judgment rule. To the extent the two
corporate law concepts can be distinguished, the choice between a weak
or strong duty of due care can then be made in reference to policy con-
siderations distinct from those underlying the business judgment rule.
Toward that end, this Article advocates that, as between the two con-
cepts, the business judgment rule should be the more modest construct;
that it, not due care, is the better choice to "freeze," leaving due care with
its concise, but fluid, "reasonable" and "prudent" elements as the superior
candidate for remaining what it should be-a highly adaptive precept in
113. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 404(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997); Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act § 409(c) (1995).
114. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 96.
115. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 official comment (1998), in 1997 MBCA Changes,
supra note 21, at 176.
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the hands of common law and equity judges. Delaware, not having codified
due care, is well positioned to pursue this approach. States with codified
standards of director conduct reflecting a traditional due care formulation
should refrain from following the revised Model Act's complex approach
without thoughtful study and a stronger case being made for why and how
those changes improve corporate law.
Whatever the fate of due care in corporate law in the new century, at
this stage the role of different legal rules is to carry different policy pref-
erences. With policy choices made clearer, through strictly limiting the
function of the business judgment rule doctrine, due care in corporate law
may indeed be cast off as a concept whose importance has been histori-
cally overstated. Alternatively, more meticulous use of legal vocabulary
may promote a rethinking of whether and why due care remains impor-
tant in modern business law. The policy stakes in that choice are more
easily seen with the help of a modest business judgment rule.
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